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Abstract
The literature has demonstrated that second-price common-value auctions are sensitive to the pres-
ence of asymmetries among bidders. In a two-bidder model, Bikhchandani [1988. Reputation in
repeated second-price auctions. J. Econ. Theory 46, 97–119] has shown that if it is common knowl-
edge that one bidder has a disadvantage compared to her opponent, that bidder (almost surely) never
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vantaged type bidder needs to win the auction with strictly positive probability. We then solve for
the equilibria in two cases, one with two types and another with a continuum of types, and we show
that they converge to the symmetric equilibria of the corresponding symmetric auctions. We thus
reestablish a lost linkage in the analysis of common-value and almost-common-value auctions.
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1. Introduction
Auction design has been lately in vogue due to the recent wave of licensing for the
third generation mobile telephony services (UMTS) throughout Europe. In those auctions,
several countries established rules to counter potentially deleterious effects created by the
presence of asymmetries among bidders. Asymmetries were considered to be prevalent
because of the coexistence in the auctions of incumbent and entrant firms in the local
telephony markets.1
Considerations about asymmetries among bidders come immediately into one’s mind
also when, for example, the object being auctioned off is a target firm in a takeover contest,
a state-owned enterprise about to be privatized, or a bankrupt firm under liquidation. In all
those cases, the market value of the assets is common to all bidders (i.e., they compete for
common-value objects), but at the same time, each of them may have an additional private
source of gains due to synergies.
Asymmetries among bidders can also be generated by the presence of liquidity con-
straints. Firms that operate within imperfect capital markets face different costs of raising
the amount of cash needed for their bids. Differences in retained earnings, in values of as-
sets appropriate for collateral, or, more generally, in access to external finance may easily
cause asymmetries among bidders.
Auction theory, for reasons of technical convenience, had traditionally focused on
symmetric environments. Nonetheless, attempts to extend the analysis to asymmetric en-
vironments have shown that most major insights derived in the symmetric case do not
continue to hold. Perhaps, the most celebrated, violent reversal of fortune has been deliv-
ered in the analysis of single-object, second-price, common-value auctions. Bikhchandani
(1988) has demonstrated that if in such an auction it is common knowledge that one of the
bidders has a disadvantage, in a stochastic sense, compared to her opponent, this bidder
(almost surely) never wins the auction. Klemperer (1998) delivered the same result in a
deterministic asymmetric auction. As a consequence of these results, it is considered that
second-price, common-value auctions may have considerably less desirable properties in
asymmetric environments compared to symmetric ones; such as, not attracting potential
bidders to the auction because they might feel intimidated by their opponents’ prowess,
or raising lower revenues in expectation to the seller.2 Actually, it is argued in Klemperer
(2002) that these theoretical results have persuaded the designers of the spectrum auctions
to establish rules that attempt to “level the field” for the entrants in the telephone markets,
who were considered to be weaker.
This paper is an attempt to further our understanding on the properties of asymmet-
ric second-price, common-value auctions. It departs from the existing literature in two
ways. First, it introduces two-sided uncertainty, i.e., it analyzes the case in which both
bidders’ types are private information. This two-sided, stochastic departure from sym-
metry seems more natural than the extensions already considered in the literature. For
1 See Klemperer (2002).
2 Milgrom and Weber (1982) have shown that in symmetric common-value environments, second-price auc-
tions, by reducing the winner’s curse, generate larger expected revenues than first-price auctions do. Bikhchandani
(1988) and Klemperer (1998) argue that this result does not carry over when asymmetries are introduced.
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it is highly unlikely that all additional bidders’ characteristics, that cause asymmetries, are
public information. One can easily appreciate this fact, when considering a model where
asymmetries are due to liquidity constraints. Public financial statements, no matter how
detailed or forthcoming they might be, never reveal all information available to manage-
ment. But even in lopsided situations, assigning unequivocally the comparative advantage
to a bidder is not a straightforward exercise.3 The second departure involves the explicit
employment of discontinuous bidding strategies.4 Bidding strategies are not required to be
continuous and strictly increasing.
Our more general framework considerably alters the outcomes derived in the literature.
Even when the probabilities that one of the bidders is an advantaged type and the other a
disadvantaged type are arbitrarily large, in equilibrium, the disadvantaged type bidder has
to win the auction with strictly positive probability, even in the state of nature in which her
opponent is actually an advantaged type. This result is delivered in generality in a two-type
model (Proposition 1). Moreover, two applications are worked out explicitly; one in a two-
type and another in a continuum-of-types model. In these applications it is actually shown
that even if the stochastic comparative advantage a bidder enjoys is large she is not able to
capitalize on it (Propositions 3 and 6). For example, in the two-type application, it is shown
that when there is only  probability for a bidder to be an advantaged type, while the other
bidder is equally likely to be of an advantaged or a disadvantaged type, the first bidder
wins the auction with probability equal to one fourth! Note that this probability of winning
is computed when the state of nature is such that the first bidder is a disadvantaged type
while her opponent an advantaged type. Clearly these results should alter one’s percep-
tion about the ability of second-price auctions to attract bidders that could be intimidated
by the presence of opponents, who may even have a substantial “stochastic comparative
advantage.”
It is also found that as we consider a sequence of auctions converging to the symmetric
one, the equilibria we construct converge to the unique symmetric equilibrium of the sym-
metric auction (Propositions 4 and 7). These results restore the “common sense” intuition
that a small advantage should not have an enormous impact on outcomes. We thus put into
a different perspective the sharp discontinuity found in the literature as one moves from
common-values to almost-common-values. Of course, it should be clear that continuity
does not imply, in any sense, similarity in the equilibrium behavior of the bidders when
confronted with different degrees of asymmetry.
Moreover, we show that the restriction to equilibria in continuous and strictly increasing
strategies imposed in the literature is a necessary condition to derive the chasm between
3 For example, even in the electromagnetic spectrum auctions, where most observers assumed that incumbents
enjoy a comparative advantage relative to entrants, one may surprisingly find difficulties in assigning “appropri-
ate” tags to bidders. For example, Börgers and Dustmann (2003) report that TIW, an entrant that won a license
in the UK 3G auction, was actually operating as a front company for Hutchison Whampoa, a corporation with
presence in the UK mobile telephony market, which was not allowed to participate in the auction as an “entrant.”
Moreover, situations where small incumbents have been confronted with entrants who were established players in
other large European telephone markets or domestic utilities with long nationwide presence in the country have
been observed in some auctions.
4 Another recent exception to the rule of restricting attention to continuous bidding strategies is Fang and
Parreiras (2002).
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results in symmetric and asymmetric auctions (Proposition 5).5 This way, we attempt to
highlight the fact that this dichotomy was delivered due to specific characteristics in the
extensions considered in the literature, and hence it can be misleading.
Of course, this analysis should not be interpreted as an innuendo for advocating a po-
sition against the importance of studying asymmetries among bidders. To the contrary,
we first explain the importance of the way one goes about introducing asymmetries (i.e.,
adding a common knowledge or a stochastic comparative advantage). And then, and per-
haps more importantly, we highlight the pedagogic importance the symmetric framework
has as a limiting case when analyzing the properties of auctions in general settings.
In short, by considering an encompassing and more natural framework to introduce
asymmetries among bidders, we reestablish a lost linkage in the analysis of pure-common-
value and almost-common-value auctions. We believe that this is of importance not only
for its aesthetic, theoretical appeal, but also because it brings back relevance to the intu-
itions gained by many theoretical results reached from the analysis of symmetric settings
when considering real case studies, where, no doubt, asymmetries abound. For an econo-
metrician, such result actually implies that it does make sense to test implications coming
out of models on symmetric auctions; an otherwise meaningless exercise, according to the
perceived in the literature fragility of the results in symmetric settings.
A related, but rather distinct, issue the paper is able to address is the issue of the effect
the severity of financial constraints has on bidders’ behavior. Until now the literature fo-
cused its analysis on budget constraints, which constitute a special form of the financial
constraints. We show that, conditional on their types, bidders bid more aggressively when
they operate in a more constrained environment. This result is due to the fact that, when
a bidder faces opponents who are more likely to face more severe financial constraints,
her winner’s curse gets attenuated.6 Nonetheless, we show that one should not extrapolate
from such result, and argue that a seller may be better off when her bidders operate in a
more financially constraint environment. Although such counterintuitive result might be
possible, we provide a wide class of distributions for which the seller is better off when her
bidders are less financially constrained.
In recent years there is a renewed theoretical interest in the effects of the introduction of
asymmetries in various auctions. As already mentioned, the first paper to study the effects
of asymmetries in second-price common-value auctions was Bikhchandani (1988). Since
then, it was Bulow and Klemperer who in a sequence of papers popularized the idea that
the introduction of asymmetries greatly affects the outcome in a second-price auction in
different contexts, and proposed ways to control for its effects. Klemperer (1998) analyzes
numerous real life examples, such as the 1995 broadband spectrum auction in the US,
in which he believes that the presence of asymmetries shaped the outcomes. Bulow et al.
(1999) analyze the effects toeholds have on takeover battles. Finally, Bulow and Klemperer
(2002) discuss how the ratio of the number of objects being auctioned off and of the num-
ber of bidders considered to be advantaged can be manipulated to mitigate the unwanted
effects asymmetries create. In a private-value framework, Maskin and Riley (2000) per-
5 In the two-type model, the constructed equilibrium involves discontinuous bidding strategies, which nonethe-
less converge to the standard continuous strategies of the symmetric auction.
6 A similar result was delivered by Fang and Parreiras (2002) in a model with budget constraints.
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form efficiency and revenue comparisons between first- and second-price auctions under
different sorts of asymmetries in beliefs. Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) study the efficiency
properties of various auctions, including one similar to ours (common values with multi-
dimensional uncertainty). Finally, Che and Gale (1998) and Zheng (2001) study the effect
of financial constraints on bidders’ behavior in private-value auctions, while Fang and Par-
reiras (2002) consider the same issue, but in a common-value setting.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model. Section 3 delivers
the general results in the two-type case. Moreover, it explicitly solves for an asymmetric
equilibrium (the only class of admissible candidate equilibria), and describes its conver-
gence and expected revenues properties. Section 4 constructs a symmetric equilibrium in
a continuum-of-types model and performs various comparative statics’ exercises. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
An auctioneer organizes an auction to sell an object. There are 2 risk-neutral bidders,
i ∈ {I, II}, competing to acquire it.
We assume that the value of the object is common to both bidders, and equals to v ∈
[v, v] ⊂ R+. This value is unknown. Each bidder though receives a private signal xi , such
that v = v(xI , xII) = xI +xII .7 The signals are assumed to be independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) according to a cumulative distribution function F . The associated density
function, f , is assumed to be absolutely continuous and strictly positive over its closed and
bounded support [0, x] ≡ X ⊂ R+.8
Each bidder receives another private signal θi ∈ [θA, θD] ≡ Θ ⊂ R++, i.i.d. across bid-
ders, distributed according to G, with absolutely continuous and strictly positive over its
support density function, g. This signal contains private information regarding bidder i’s
marginal utility of income due to differential access to external sources of finance.9 Finally,
there is no correlation between the two signals.
From now on, we will refer to θi as the type of bidder i, and to xi as the signal she has
received (i.e., a bidder who has observed the pair (x, θ) will be referred to hereafter as a
θ -type bidder with signal x).
Bidder i’s utility is Ûi = v − θipi . Nonetheless, instead of understanding the auction
as one of pure common values in which bidders differ in their marginal utility of income,
it is convenient to analyze it as an auction in which the bidders have identical marginal
7 The normalization that the value of the object is the sum of the signals is only made for notational and
computational convenience. No results rely on it. An auction for such object is coined in the literature as the
“wallet game.”
8 The lower bound of the support is chosen to be zero to relieve notational burden. The extent to which this
normalization affects the results will be explained as we proceed.
9 This is just one possible way to introduce asymmetries. Nonetheless, one can immediately see that the em-
ployed canonical model can be used to analyze the effects of asymmetries created by any other cause mentioned
in Introduction.
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utilities of income, but they value the object differently. In this case, bidder i’s utility can
be rewritten as
Ui = v
θi
− pi.
Clearly, a bidder who has drawn a low θ has a comparative advantage compared to one
who has observed a larger realization. Spanning through all possible realizations, the bidder
with θA is the most advantaged-type bidder, and the one with θD is the most disadvantaged-
type bidder.
The equilibrium notion we employ is stronger than the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium,
as we impose the refinement the equilibrium to be in undominated strategies. In this
two-bidder game, the equilibrium set in undominated strategies coincides with the set of
trembling-hand-perfect equilibria (see Jackson, 1999). Essentially, this implies that a bid
has to be at least as large as the minimum value of the object, given the signals the bid-
der received, i.e., bi(xi, θi) xi/θi .10 The set of bids satisfying the above condition with
equality defines a plane on the (xi, θi, bi)-space, which separates the set of all possible bids
into two half-spaces. All bids belonging to the lower half-space, in which the above con-
dition does not hold, allow for the possibility that the bidder may regret losing, regardless
of the opponent’s bidding strategy. The bidder can avoid this risk by placing a bid along
the separating plane, without at the same time risking inducing a positive probability of
regretting winning. In that sense, all bids in the lower half-space are dominated by bids
lying on the separating plane, regardless of the opponent’s bidding strategy, i.e., they guar-
antee the minmax payoff. Interpreted this way, the bids lying on the separating plane can
be understood as the “individually rational ” bids.
3. Being disadvantaged is not fatal
In this section, we consider that θ is distributed according to a two-point distribution
Θ ≡ {θA, θD}. A bidder who receives signal θA is called A-type, while if she receives θD ,
D-type.11 Bidder i is A-type with probability µi , where µi ∈ (0,1), and D-type with the
complementary probability. The bidder with the larger µi is the one who has the stochastic
comparative advantage.
3.1. General results
The most striking result in the literature on asymmetric, second-price, common-value
auctions is that a bidder who has a disadvantage compared to her opponent (almost surely)
never wins the auction. In a model with one-sided uncertainty about one bidder’s type,
Bikhchandani (1988) shows that this result holds even if the probability that one bidder is
more advantaged than the other is vanishingly small. In a deterministic framework, Bulow
and Klemperer (2002) deliver the same result even when they allow the differences between
types to become negligible.
10 This restriction is frequently made to rule out unreasonable equilibria, e.g., Bikhchandani (1988).
11 The notation i-j bidder, where i = {I, II} and j = {A,D}, denotes in this section a j -type bidder i.
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In this section, we show that this result is not robust to the introduction of two-sided
uncertainty about the type of the two bidders. Specifically, we show that even if the prob-
abilities that one of the bidders is A-type and the other D-type are arbitrarily large, it is
possible that a D-type bidder wins the auction. It should be noted that she wins the auc-
tion with strictly positive probability even in the state of nature in which her opponent is
A-type. This result holds regardless of whether the D-type bidder is the one considered to
have the stochastic comparative advantage or not. In other words, we prove a more general
version of the statement needed to show that the results shown in the literature do not carry
over when one allows for two-sided uncertainty. Most notably, it holds even when µI is 
close to 1 and µII is  close to 0, and the actual state of nature is the most probable one,
i.e., bidder I is A-type and bidder II is D-type. The following proposition states formally
the result.12
Proposition 1. For all (µI ,µII), in every equilibrium in non-decreasing, pure strategies of
this auction, there exists a D-type bidder who must win over an A-type bidder with strictly
positive probability.
Proof. Assume not. In such case, in equilibrium, a D-type bidder wins with zero proba-
bility over an A-type bidder, and therefore an A-type bidder should assign zero probability
to the event that she ties with a D-type bidder. Concentrate first on symmetric strategies.
An A-type bidder must bid in equilibrium bA(x) = 2x/θA; i.e., the strategies derived in
Milgrom (1981). In such equilibrium, for a D-type bidder to never win, she must bid
bD(x) = 0. Consider a D-type bidder with signal x¯. The bid coming out of her individ-
ually rational strategy is x¯/θD . By bidding it, she wins whenever 2x/θA < x¯/θD . Hence,
she wins against an A-type bidder with signal x ∈ [0, x¯θA/(2θD)), while making positive
profits conditional on winning. (The true value to her is (x¯ + x)/θD , whereas she pays no
more than x¯/θD .) Since this deviation is profitable, it contradicts equilibrium strategies.
Consider now asymmetric strategies. The proof is split into two cases: (a) We first show
that there exists no equilibrium strategy in which one of the A-type bidders (say I-A) al-
ways wins over a positive mass of II-A bidders with signals x ∈ S ⊆ X. We have to analyze
two situations: (i) II-A bidder uses an increasing strategy. As D-type bidders always lose,
bII-A(x) x¯/θD , ∀x ∈ S. Take y = x¯θA/θD . Assume w.l.o.g. that y ∈ S. Consider the I-A
bidder with signal , where  → 0. She is making losses when winning over a II-A bidder
with signal x ∈ [0, y). To see this, just notice that when winning the price is greater than
the true value. Further, she does not make positive profits winning over a II-A bidder with
signal larger than y, as such bidder bids at least her individual rational bid. Thus, she is
better off by deviating down to bII-A(0). (ii) II-A bidder’s strategy has a flat interval, i.e.,
∃[x1, x2] ⊂ S such that bII-A(x) = b,∀x ∈ [x1, x2]. For such strategy to be individually
12 The normalization that the lower bound in the support of x is zero allows us to make the proposition statement
unconditionally. Otherwise, it would have been necessary to assume that (x¯ + x)/θD > 2x/θA . That is, that the
individually rational bid of the least advantaged type when receiving the highest possible signal is larger than the
individually rational bid of the most advantaged type when receiving the lowest possible signal. This is nothing
more than the weakest condition needed in an auction to ensure the presence of real competition among bidders.
This condition is trivially satisfied when x = 0.
7
rational, b  x2/θA. But then the I-A bidder with signal  is better off by deviating down
and not winning over any II-A bidder with signal x ∈ [x1, x2].
(b) We now show that there exists no equilibrium strategy in which I-A and II-A bidders
tie among themselves while D-type bidders always lose. Assume it does. Let II-A bidder
use an increasing strategy. Consider again a I-A bidder with signal ,  → 0. Assume
that this bidder ties with a II-A bidder with signal M . Bertrand competition among them
implies that bI-A() = ( + M)/θA  x¯/θD . As  → 0, M/θA  x¯/θD which implies that
M  (θA/θD)x¯ > 0. Therefore, M  0. Take a II-A bidder with signal m < M who ties
with a I-A bidder with signal r . In a tie, (m+r)/θA  x¯/θD . As m → 0, r  (θA/θD)x¯ > ;
which contradicts increasing strategies. So if an equilibrium exists, the bidding strategies
must have flat intervals. Employing similar arguments as in the previous case one can show
that this is not possible. 
The intuition behind the result is the following: An A-type bidder cannot bid very ag-
gressively because she knows that with positive probability she may be playing against a
bidder who may also be an A-type. If both are aggressive, they end up regretting when
winning. Even if the probability of meeting an A-type is very small, the bidder’s attention
is concentrated on this event. This reluctance, on the other hand, makes the D-type bidders
less cautious, and as a result the extreme situation analyzed in the literature is not obtained.
D-type bidders need to win with strictly positive probability in all equilibria of the auction.
The next proposition further characterizes the set of admissible equilibria in this auction.
Namely, it shows that there are no symmetric equilibria.13
Proposition 2. There exist no symmetric equilibria in non-decreasing pure strategies.
Proof. We first show that symmetric equilibrium bidding functions must be single-valued
and continuous, i.e., there are no gaps. The proof is by contradiction. Assume w.l.o.g. that
an A-type bidder’s equilibrium strategy has a gap at M , i.e., bA(M) = bH > bA(M − ) =
bL. Two cases have to be considered: (a) Assume  x such that bD(x) ∈ (bL, bH ). Condi-
tional on winning, lim→0 v(M − , y) = v(M,y). Thus, either the bidder with signal M
makes strictly positive profits, and hence the bidder with signal M −  has incentives to
raise her bid; or she makes losses and hence has incentives to lower her bid. Note that if she
makes zero profits, the bidder with signal M − makes profits and hence she has incentives
to lower her bid. (b) Assume ∃ [xL, xH ] ⊂ X such that bD(x) ∈ (bL, bH ), ∀x ∈ [xL, xH ].
In a symmetric equilibrium, bA(x)  bD(x),∀x. Just notice that for any price a D-type
bidder with signal x is willing to pay, an A-type bidder with the same signal makes strictly
more profits. This implies that xL > M − . Given that the bidder with signal M −  loses
over these D-type bidders whereas the one with signal M wins, she has incentives not
to raise her bid only if: E
[
bD(y)|y ∈ [xL, xH ]
]= M + E [y|y ∈ [xL, xH ]]> 2M , where
13 Jackson (1999) provides an example with private and common value components in which a symmetric equi-
librium does also fail to exist. His example is quite different from our setup as the common value component is
either 0 or v and the private component is either 0 or 1 with equal probability. Nevertheless, the intuition for the
non-existence in his example is similar to ours. It is the impossibility to order bids in such a way that inferences
from prices be monotonic; i.e., that larger bids generate larger expected values of the object in the event of ties.
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the inequality holds because xL > M − . Hence, in equilibrium bA(M) > 2M . But then
one of the A-type bidders, say bidder I, with signal M can make more profits by lowering
her bid, contradicting symmetric equilibrium. Hence, symmetric equilibria have to be in
continuous strategies.
Assume now, by way of contradiction, that there exists an equilibrium in symmetric
strategies. If this is the case, they have to be continuous. Further, an A-type bidder with
signal x¯ must win with probability 1. Since by Proposition 1, a D-type bidder cannot al-
ways lose, and since strategies are shown to be continuous, there exists a signal Z < x¯
such that bA(Z) = bD(x¯). Now, the unique equilibrium strategy for an A-type bidder with
signal greater than Z is bA(x) = 2x/θA, ∀x > Z. The continuity of the strategies im-
plies that bA(Z) = bD(x¯) = 2Z/θA. Now, consider an A-type bidder with signal Z − . If
bA(Z − ) < 2Z/θA, then by deviating and bidding 2Z/θA, she pays at most her bid, while
the true value when tying with a bid 2Z/θA is (1/θA){(Z − ) + (µiZ + (1 − µi)x¯)} >
2Z/θA. Since the deviation is profitable and strategies are assumed non-decreasing, it must
be the case that bA(Z − ) = 2Z/θA. By the same argument, this must also be the bid of
any A-type bidder with signal y ∈ [z,Z], where z is such that z + {µi(E[x|x ∈ [z,Z]]) +
(1 − µi)x¯} = 2Z. Given that z < Z, one of the A-type bidders can make more profits by
slightly increasing her bid. (The price she will pay is almost surely the same but she will
increase the probability of winning.) Therefore, the deviation is profitable; a contradiction.
This concludes the proof. 
The logic behind the non-existence result can be deciphered by following the steps of the
proof. The presence of asymmetries among bidders alters the nature of the winner’s curse
each bidder faces. For an A-type it gets milder due to the presence of D-type bidders: an
A-type bidder may outbid opponents with signals higher than hers, who cannot bid higher
because they are of D-type. (The opposite is true for a D-type bidder, her winner’s curse
gets stronger because of the presence of A-type bidders.) On the other hand, the probability
that an A-type bidder places on the event that she ties with a D-type bidder decreases as
her signal gets larger. As a result, the marginal A-type bidder, i.e., the one who ties with
a D-type bidder with the highest signal, gets a less severe winner’s curse than the A-type
bidder with signal slightly above hers. Note that the former ties also with D-types, whereas
the latter only ties with A-types. Because of this, the A-type marginal bidder is willing
to place a strictly larger bid than an A-type bidder with slightly larger signal. Hence, an
equilibrium in non-decreasing strategies cannot be obtained.14
Nonetheless, there exist asymmetric equilibria in such auction. The next subsection fully
characterizes a pure-strategy, asymmetric equilibrium, and discusses its properties in an
application with uniform distributions.
14 The presence of a critical bid, above which a D-type bidder never places her bid, is crucial for the non-
existence result. If there does not exist such bid, i.e., a bid in the neighborhood of which the distribution of
types that place bids changes discretely, then equilibria in non-decreasing symmetric strategies may exist. In
Section 4, we provide such an equilibrium for a continuum-of-types model. There, as we consider higher bids,
disadvantaged type bidders drop out of the auction, but this happens smoothly. As a result, no discrete jump in
the “perceived” value of the object occurs, and hence the construction of non-decreasing symmetric equilibrium
strategies is possible.
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3.2. Asymmetric equilibria and their convergence properties
3.2.1. Characterization of an equilibrium
Consider the following example: the xi ’s are uniformly drawn from [0,1], θA = 1, and
θD = 2.
The following proposition fully characterizes an asymmetric equilibrium in which a
D-type bidder has a strictly positive probability of winning over an A-type bidder.15
Proposition 3. For all µI , and for each µII no larger than 1/2, the following bidding
strategies constitute an equilibrium:
(I) bI-A(x) =
{
x + s x ∈ [0,Q]
2x x ∈ (Q,1] , b
I-D(x) =
{
x x ∈ [0, s]
x + s x ∈ (s,1] ,
(II) bII-A(x) =
{
s x ∈ [0, s]
2M x ∈ (s,M]
2x x ∈ (M,1]
, bII-D(x) =
{
x x ∈ [0, s]
s x ∈ (s,1] ,
where s = (1 − µII −
√
µII − µ2II)/(1 − 2µII), M = (1 + s)/2, and Q = (3 + s)/4.
Proof. We first show that there is no signal x ∈ X, such that I-A bidder, by deviating
from the above strategies, can make more profits. If x = 0, by following the purported
equilibrium strategies, in the event of a tie, after updating her beliefs about the type of
the opponent she tied with, she makes zero profits: Just notice that, by the definition of s,
µIIs(s/2 − s) + (1 − µII)(1 − s)((1 + s)/2 − s) = 0. Moreover, there is no other bid that
gives her larger profits. If x ∈ (0,Q), she makes positive profits by winning over a II-A
bidder with signal in [0, s] and over any II-D bidder. By deviating up to win over a II-A
bidder with signal in [s,M], she only succeeds in reducing her profits. Just notice that
x+ (M + s)/2−2M < Q+ (M + s)/2−2M = 0. When x = Q, she is indifferent between
bidding Q+s and 2Q. The only payoff-difference between these two strategies is that with
the former she loses against a II-A bidder with signal in [s,M], whereas with the latter
she wins over her. Since, conditional on winning, expected profits are zero (just notice
that Q + (M + s)/2 − 2M = (3 + s)/4 + (1 + 3s)/4 − (1 + s) = 0), the two strategies
are payoff-equivalent for the bidder. Clearly, if a I-A bidder with signal Q is indifferent
between winning or not over a II-A bidder with signal in [s,M], a I-A bidder with signal
larger than Q does not regret winning. Hence, I-A bidder’s strategy is best response against
bidder II’s strategies.
We now show that there is no signal x ∈ X, such that II-A bidder can profitably deviate
from her purported equilibrium strategy. If x ∈ [0, s), by following the strategy, she loses
against any I-A bidder and a I-D bidder with signal in [s,1], but she does not regret losing.
If she bids higher so as to win, she suffers a loss equal to s − x > 0. When x ∈ [s,M], she
wins against a I-A bidder with signal in [0,Q), and against any I-D bidder. She does not
regret winning since, by doing so, she gains at least x − s > 0. For any signal x ∈ [s,Q),
15 The presented equilibrium is not unique. Within the same spirit, more equilibria can be constructed. Nonethe-
less, they are more complex and they exist for a more restricted range of µ’s.
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she loses against a I-A with signal in [Q,1], but she does not regret losing. If she bids
higher so as to win, she loses at least x − Q > 0. Finally, when her signal is larger than Q
she follows the strategy 2x. By doing so, she wins over a I-A bidder with signal smaller
than hers and makes profits upon outbidding them. By deviating up, to win over a I-A
bidder with signal larger than hers, she makes loses. As she also makes profits by winning
over a I-D bidder, there is no other strategy that gives her larger profits. Hence, no deviation
is profitable.
Consider now D-type bidders. When they tie with their opponent, and according to the
equilibrium strategies they assign zero probabilities to the event that they have tied with
an A-type bidder, they play the unique symmetric equilibrium of an auction where: (a)
it is common knowledge that both bidders have the same type, and (b) the signal space is
truncated to contain only signals in which, by following the above specified strategies, they
would have never tied with an A-type bidder. This ensures that the purported equilibrium
strategies of D-type bidders with signal in [0, s) are indeed equilibrium strategies. We now
show that D-type bidders with larger signals do not want to deviate either. A I-D bidder
with signal s is indifferent between bidding s and 2s. The only payoff-difference between
these two strategies is that with the former she ties against a II-A bidder with signal in
[0, s] and against a II-D bidder with signal in [s,1], whereas with the latter she wins over
both types. Since, conditional upon winning, expected payoffs are zero (just notice that,
by the definition of s, µIIs(3s/4 − s) + (1 − µII)(1 − s)((3s + 1)/4 − s) = 0), the two
strategies are payoff-equivalent for this bidder. Since she is indifferent between tying or
losing against those bidders, a I-D bidder with larger signal strictly prefers to win. Finally,
notice that a I-D bidder with signal in (s,1] loses against a II-A bidder with signal larger
than s, and she does not regret it.
Now a II-D bidder with signal in [s,1] loses against a I-D bidder with signal larger
than s and against any I-A bidder. We now show that a II-D bidder with signal 1 does not
want to deviate. She is willing to pay at most 1. Given that a I-D bidder with signal s bids
2s > 1, she does not want to outbid her. Similarly, she does not regret losing against a I-A
bidder with signal 0, as the price she has to pay to win is s, while the true value conditional
on winning is 1/2 < s. Clearly, if there is no profitable deviation for her, there cannot be
any for a II-D bidder with a smaller signal.
We have proved that the preceding strategies are best responses against each other.
Hence, they do constitute an equilibrium. Finally, notice that if µII is no larger than 1/2,
then s is no smaller than 1/2. This means that, when bidding s, a II-D bidder with sig-
nal 1 bids more than her individual rational bid, which is 1/2. Therefore, the strategies are
individually rational. 
It is worth highlighting an interesting property of the equilibrium: A D-type bidder has
a strictly positive probability of winning the auction over an A-type bidder. Just notice that
bidder I-D with signal x ∈ [s,1] beats bidder II-A with signal x ∈ [0, s). Moreover, the
equilibrium is independent of the actual values of µI . So even if µI takes small values, the
probability with which bidder I-D wins the auction over bidder II-A can be pretty large.
This can be easily shown by checking the strategies in Fig. 1.
For example, by setting µII = 1/2 and µI = , one can find that the probability bidder
I-D wins over bidder II-A is 1/4. Hence, we do not speak about an  probability event.
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Fig. 1. Bidding strategies.
Even if the stochastic comparative advantage bidder II enjoys is large, this bidder cannot
capitalize on this enhanced reputation and she ends up losing the auction with a large
probability, even in the state of nature in which she is A-type playing against a D-type
opponent.
The equilibria that arise in this model are qualitatively very different from a symmetric
equilibrium. First of all, as it was derived in Proposition 2, they have to be in asymmetric
strategies. Moreover, the bidding functions are neither strictly monotonic in the signals,
and as it will become clear in the next subsection, nor in the stochastic comparative advan-
tage.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the above constructed equilibrium also differs
from the asymmetric equilibria of the symmetric auction. Note that these asymmetric equi-
libria of the symmetric auction have been heavily employed to derive the asymmetric
equilibria found in models with deterministic comparative advantage (Bikhchandani, 1988
and Klemperer, 1998). At those asymmetric equilibria, a bidder is assigned an aggressive
bidding strategy and her opponent a corresponding conservative strategy. The bidders do
not alter their behavior throughout the signal space, i.e., the aggressive bidder remains ag-
gressive regardless of receiving low or high signal. This is not the case here. For example,
in the above described equilibrium, bidder I-A starts by being very aggressive when re-
ceiving a low signal, but then the degree of aggressiveness decreases, and for a range of
intermediate signals, bidder II-A is the aggressive one.
Another novel characteristic of the equilibrium is that for a non-degenerate range of sig-
nals the equilibrium involves strategies that are symmetric. This is the case for the D-type
bidders when receiving a low signal (less than s), and for the A-type bidders when re-
ceiving a high enough signal (more than Q). In that sense, it was deliberately attempted
to construct the above described equilibrium as close as possible to a symmetric equilib-
rium.
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3.2.2. Convergence properties
It is of great importance to understand the behavior of the equilibrium as one considers
the limit case in which the uncertainty about both or one of the bidders disappears. This
can be studied by considering different scenarios. First, the two bidders may end up be-
coming similar. In this case the auction converges to a symmetric one with no uncertainty.
Alternatively, the difference between the two bidders may become large. Finally, we will
consider the case in which the auction converges to an asymmetric auction with one-sided
uncertainty. Since the equilibrium strategies are independent of µI , one can perform these
exercises by just studying the strategies as µII approaches zero.
Let 〈µIIn〉 be a decreasing sequence of real numbers with µIIn > 0, and limn→∞ µIIn = 0.
Let ΓµI ,µIIn be the auction game in which bidder I is A-type with probability µI and
bidder II with probability µIIn . For each n, and for every µI > 0, the set of strategies
{bI-AµIIn , bII-AµIIn , bI-DµIIn , bII-DµIIn } in Proposition 3 constitute an equilibrium of the game ΓµI ,µIIn ,
for sn = (1 − µIIn −
√
µIIn − µ2IIn)/(1 − 2µIIn), Mn = (1 + sn)/2 and Qn = (3 + sn)/4.
We first show that as the auction converges to a symmetric one in which both bidders are
known to be D-type, the strategies in Proposition 3 converge to the symmetric equilibrium
strategies “à la Milgrom,” i.e., bI-D(x) = bII-D(x) = x for all x ∈ [0,1].
Proposition 4. If ΓµI ,µIIn → Γ0,0, then bI-DµIIn and bII-DµIIn converge almost uniformly to Mil-
grom’s symmetric equilibrium strategies.
Proof. As µIIn → 0, bII-DµIIn converges pointwise boundedly to bII-D(x) = x for every
x ∈ [0,1], whereas bI-DµIIn converges a.e. to bI-D(x) = x. Notice that it converges pointwise
to the function f (x) = x whenever x ∈ [0,1] and to f (x) = 2 whenever x = 1. Hence,
the result follows from Egoroff’s theorem, as we have a sequence of measurable functions
that converge a.e. on a bounded set to a continuous function. (See Royden, 1988, Chap-
ter 3.) 
This result should be contrasted to the one derived by Bikhchandani in his framework,
where it is shown that the symmetric equilibrium strategy does not belong to the set of
equilibrium strategies for a D-type bidder as one considers a sequence of auctions con-
verging to a symmetric auction.16 Moreover, it puts under a different light the widely held
belief that the introduction of the slightest asymmetry alters completely the analysis of a
second-price, common-value auction. The symmetric auction is robust to small changes
towards asymmetry in the following sense: When considering a sequence of auctions con-
verging to the symmetric one, the asymmetric equilibrium we construct converges to the
unique symmetric equilibrium of the symmetric auction.17
16 See Bikhchandani, 1988, Proposition 3, p. 111.
17 It is straightforward to show that the same continuity results also hold when we consider expected revenues.
As µI → µII → 0, expected revenues can be easily computed; they converge to 1/3. Just notice that they are
equal to the expected revenues coming out of the symmetric equilibrium of the symmetric auction in which both
bidders are known to be D-type.
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We now turn to the case in which the auction converges to the “Bikhchandani
framework”—i.e., there is one-sided uncertainty. This can be done by taking ΓµI ,µIIn →
Γ0,µIIn , i.e., µI → 0 and µIIn ∈ (0,1/2). Now bidder I wins with strictly positive probabil-
ity even in the event that her opponent is A-type. This divergence from the result reached
by Bikhchandani is due to the fact that we have constructed an equilibrium with discon-
tinuous and/or flat strategies while the analysis in Bikhchandani is confined to continuous
and strictly increasing strategies.18
Proposition 5. Consider an asymmetric, common-value, second-price auction with one-
sided uncertainty. There does not exist an equilibrium in which a D-type bidder wins over
an A-type opponent if and only if the equilibrium is in continuous and strictly increasing
strategies.
Proof. Sufficiency is proved in Bikhchandani, 1988, Proposition 1, p. 108. Necessity is
derived by the counterexample presented above. 
In contrast, were we considering the opposite situation where ΓµI ,µIIn → ΓµI ,0, i.e.,
µIIn → 0, and µI ∈ (0,1), where the limiting equilibrium employs strictly increasing
strategies, Bikhchandani’s result would be valid.19
Finally, consider the case in which the auction converges to a deterministic asymmetric
auction, as in Klemperer (1998). This is done by considering µI → 1 and µII → 0. In this
case the relevant strategies are those of A-type bidder I and D-type bidder II. It is clear
that now the D-type bidder will never win. Hence, the equilibrium outcome of the auction
converges almost uniformly to the one found in the literature.20
4. Continuum-of-types case
In this section we analyze the model when the distribution of θ is continuous. We first
proceed to show that, unlike the two-type case, there exists now a symmetric equilibrium in
continuous strategies. We then derive the convergence properties of the constructed equilib-
rium and we show that it converges to the symmetric equilibrium of the symmetric auction.
We thus deliver, also in this case, the continuity result between pure-common-values and
almost-common-values we established in the two-type case. Finally, we perform compar-
ative statics’ with respect to the distribution of the θs. Such exercise is of interest because
it allows us to see how the behavior of bidders gets affected by the severity of the financial
constraints they face.
18 The next section, by considering the continuum-of-types case, constructs an equilibrium with the same qual-
itative properties as the one in Proposition 3, but in continuous and strictly increasing strategies. Hence, the main
results delivered in this section do not hinge on the fact that we allow for discontinuities.
19 Note that as ΓµI ,µIIn → ΓµI ,0, all bI -AµIIn , bI -DµIIn , and bII-DµIIn converge almost uniformly to equilibrium strate-
gies à la Bikhchandani. In particular, bI -AµIIn (x) → x + 1, bI -DµIIn (x) → x, and bII-DµIIn (x) → x.
20 Note that as ΓµI ,µIIn → Γ1,0, bI -AµIIn and bII-DµIIn converge uniformly to asymmetric equilibrium strategies à la
Milgrom. In particular, bI -AµIIn (x) → x + 1, and bII-DµIIn (x) → x.
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4.1. Characterization of the symmetric equilibrium
We now characterize the equilibrium of the auction when x is uniformly distributed on
[0, x], and θ is distributed in the interval [θA, θD] according to a c.d.f. G, with a continuous
and differentiable density g. We further assume that θD − θA  θA.21
We show that in this case, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in pure, continuous, and
strictly monotone strategies, so that bI (x, θ) = bII(x, θ) = b(x, θ),∀x, θ .
Proposition 6. The following strategies constitute a symmetric equilibrium in pure, con-
tinuous, and strictly monotone strategies:
b∗(x, θ) = x + x
E(b)
θ
,
where
xE(b) ≡ E[x | (x, θ) ∈ b∗(x, θ) = b]= z1(b)m(b) + (1 − z1(b))M(b),
with
z1(b) = w1,∀b b∗(x¯, θD),
m(b) ≡ [y ∈ X | b∗(y, θA) = b], and
M(b) ≡
{ [y ∈ X | b∗(y, θD) = b] ∀b b∗(x¯, θD),
x¯ otherwise.
Proof. 22 Any strategy that is part of a symmetric equilibrium has to be decreasing in θ .
Just notice, that for any price an (x, θ)-bidder is willing to pay for the object, an (x, θ − )-
bidder makes strictly more profits when outbidding the same set of opponents. Similarly,
it is easy to see that they have to be increasing in x.
Further, in any symmetric equilibrium b(0, θ) = 0,∀θ . Suppose on the contrary that
there exists a bid function b(x, θ) such that (b, b) is an equilibrium and b(0, θ) = a > 0.
When bidder I observes xI = a/2 and θI = θD , bidding 0 rather than the prescribed equi-
librium bid (i.e., a + a) will only matter in the event of a winning bid. The probability
of such event is positive. Now when bidding a +a and winning, she obtains an expected
profit which is bounded above by (1/θD)(a/2 + a/2) − a. Notice that since strategies are
decreasing in θ , this bidder estimates the expected signal of her opponent as bounded above
by a/2. As the upper bound on her expected profit is negative, she is hence strictly better
off by deviating down and bidding 0, contradicting equilibrium strategies.
Let (b◦, b◦) be a symmetric equilibrium. Let us define its common bidding range as bids
below B¯ , where B¯ = b◦(x¯, θA). Similarly, let B̂ = b◦(x¯, θD). Since (b◦, b◦) is a symmetric
21 To characterize the equilibrium we assume that, conditional on a tie at b, the expected value of the object
for a (0, θA)-bidder is no larger than the expected value for an (x, θD)-bidder. A sufficient condition for this to
hold is θD − θA  θA . In Appendix A, we show how the result generalizes to other supports for which the above
condition fails to hold. In particular, to facilitate the exposition we employ there an example where it is assumed
that x is uniformly distributed on [0,1], whereas θ is uniformly distributed on [1,4].
22 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for proposing the use of line integrals to simplify the exposition
of the proof, and to generalize an earlier statement of the proposition.
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equilibrium, for every b ∈ [0, B̂], there exists a pair m(b) and M(b) in [0, x¯], such that b =
b◦(m, θA) and b = b◦(M, θD). Similarly, for every b ∈ (B̂, B¯] there exists m(b) ∈ (0, x¯]
and θ˜ (b) ∈ [θA, θD), such that b = b◦(m, θA) and b = b◦(x¯, θ˜ ).
We now show that a pair of b∗(x, θ)’s constitute a symmetric equilibrium. Suppose that
bidder II adopts b∗ and consider the optimal response by bidder I. Every (x, θ)-bidder I
maximizes her expected profit by bidding up to the point where she is indifferent whether
she is selected as a winner, when she is involved in a tie. Notice that such a bid maximizes
her probability of winning, conditional on making non-negative profits when winning.
Now, the true value of the object when bidding b and facing a tie is (x + xE(b))/θ , where
xE(b) stands for the expected value of the bidder II’s signal in the event of a tie, when bid-
ding b. As b∗(x, θ) is equal to this expression, (b∗, b∗) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium
in continuous strategies.
To compute xE(b), we distinguish two cases:
(1) Bids below B̂ . Thereafter, we will also refer to these bids as “low” bids. For any
b  B̂ , there is a set of points (x, θ) that belong to the iso-bid b∗II(x, θ) = b, which we
shall denote by Γ = {(x(t), θ(t)): t ∈ [0,1]}. Consequently, xE(b) is the expectation of X
along a path, and is given by the following expression23:
xE(b) = E[X | (X,Θ) ∈ Γ ]= ∫ 10 x(t)fL(x(t), θ(t))√(x′(t))2 + (θ ′(t))2 dt∫ 1
0 fL(x(t), θ(t))
√
(x′(t))2 + (θ ′(t))2 dt
,
where fL(x, θ) stands for the probability distribution of the types of a bidder in the iso-
bid, i.e., the joint density of X and Θ . In particular, fL(x(t), θ(t)) = 1x(1)−x(0) g(θ(t)).24
Consider the path (m(b), θA) and (M(b), θD) to be a simple arc. Since the set of all possible
types X × Θ is connected, any simple linear parameterization can be used to evaluate
the path integral. In particular, we consider x(t) = m(b) + (M(b) − m(b))t and θ(t) =
θA + (θD − θA)t , for 0 t  1. Consequently,
xE(b) =
∫ 1
0
(
m(b)+ (M(b) − m(b))t) g(θA+(θD−θA)t)
x(1)−x(0)
√
(M(b) − m(b))2 + (θD − θA)2 dt∫ 1
0
g(θA+(θD−θA)t)
x(1)−x(0)
√
(M(b) − m(b))2 + (θD − θA)2 dt
.
After straightforward computations and integration by parts, one obtains that
23 An iso-bid in the xθ -plane generates a path, i.e., a set of points (x, θ) for which
x = ϕ(t), θ = ψ(t) 0 t  1,
where ϕ(t),ψ(t) ∈ C for 0 t  1. If f : S ⊆ Rn → R is a continuous scalar field and C is a simple arc in S,
then the integral of f over C is defined by
∫
C
f ds =
1∫
0
f (α(t))‖α′(t)‖dt
where α: [0,1] → Rn is any simple parameterization of C (see Baxandall and Liebeck, 1986).
24 The results that follow can, alternatively, be derived from the fact that b∗ induces linear iso-bids, and hence
omitting line integrals.
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xE(b) =
1∫
0
(
m(b) + (M(b) − m(b))t)g(θA + (θD − θA)t)dt
= M(b) − (M(b) − m(b)) 1∫
0
G
(
θA + (θD − θA)t
)
dt
= w1m(b) + (1 − w1)M(b),
where
w1 =
1∫
0
G
(
θA + (θD − θA)t
)
dt.
Note that the weights on the end points of the path are solely determined by the distribution
of θ .
(2) Bids in (B̂, B¯]. Thereafter, we will also refer to these bids as “high” bids.
For this set of bids we have,
xE(b) =
∫ 1
0 x(t)fH (x(t), θ(t))
√
(x′(t))2 + (θ ′(t))2 dt∫ 1
0 fH (x(t), θ(t))
√
(x′(t))2 + (θ ′(t))2 dt
,
where now we have that fH (x, θ) = 1x(1)−x(0) g(θ(t))G(θ(1)) . Note that for these bids we must
integrate over a path between (m(b), θA) and (x¯, θ˜ (b)). By using an equivalent linear para-
meterization for the curve x(t) = m(b) + (x¯ − m(b))t and θ(t) = θA + (θ˜(b) − θA)t , for
0 t  1, we get the following expression:
xE(b) =
∫ 1
0
(
m(b) + (x¯ − m(b))t) g(θA+(θ˜(b)−θA)t)
G(θ˜(b))(x(1)−x(0))
√
(x¯ − m(b))2 + (θ˜ (b) − θA)2 dt∫ 1
0
g(θA+(θ˜(b)−θA)t)
G(θ˜(b))(x(1)−x(0))
√
(x¯ − m(b))2 + (θ˜(b) − θA)2 dt
=
1∫
0
(
m(b) + (x¯ − m(b))t)g(θA + (θ˜(b) − θA)t)
G(θ˜(b))
dt
= x¯ −
(
x¯ − m(b)
G(θ˜(b))
) 1∫
0
G
(
θA +
(
θ˜ (b) − θA
)
t
)
dt
= z1(b)m(b) + (1 − z1(b))x¯,
where
z1(b) = 1
G(θ˜(b))
1∫
0
G
(
θA +
(
θ˜ (b) − θA
)
t
)
dt.
One can check that as b → B¯ , m(b) → m(B¯) = x¯, and hence xE(b) → x¯.
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Finally, the existence of a continuous function b∗ that satisfies all the above equations
can be easily shown by construction. Consider first an (x, θ)-bidder such that b∗(x, θ) ∈
[0, b∗(x¯, θD)]. Let b∗(x, θ) = b. The definition of b∗ implies that the following system of
equations must hold:
b − 1
θ
(
x + w1m(b) + (1 − w1)M(b)
)= 0,
b − 1
θA
(
m(b) + w1m(b) + (1 − w1)M(b)
)= 0,
b − 1
θD
(
M(b) + w1m(b) + (1 − w1)M(b)
)= 0.
From the system, it is clear that both m(b) and M(b) are linear functions of b. Recall that
w1 only depends on G. Consequently, for each (x, θ) there exists a unique b that solves
the system. Further, the solution yields
b∗(x, θ) = 2x
2θ − w1θA − (1 − w1)θD , (1)
which is indeed increasing in x, and decreasing in θ . Consider now an (x, θ)-bidder, such
that b∗(x, θ) ∈ (b∗(x¯, θD), b∗(x¯, θA)). Solving an equivalent system of equations, the so-
lution yields
b∗(x, θ) = 2x
2θ − z1(b)θA − (1 − z1(b))θ˜ (b)
. (2)
Nonetheless, for these high bids, it is necessary to pin down the function θ˜ (b). Let
b∗(x, θ) = b. By the definition of b∗ we know that the equilibrium bid of a (m(b), θA)-
type is equal to b = (m(b) + xE(b))/θA, or equivalently, that xE(b) = θAb − m(b). Since
there exists a (x¯, θ˜ (b))-type that submits the same bid, the following condition must also
hold: b = (x¯ + xE(b))/θ˜(b). By combining the two, we can obtain an explicit expression
for θ˜ (b). In particular, we get that
θ˜ (b) = θA + x¯ − m(b)
b
.
Now in order for the equilibrium to exist, this θ˜ (b) must be consistent with the proposed
equilibrium: i.e., it must be decreasing in b, with θ˜ (b∗(x¯, θD)) = θD and θ˜ (b∗(x¯, θA)) =
θA. It is easy to see that θ˜ (b) is decreasing in b. Notice that
∂θ˜(b)
∂b
= −m
′(b)b − (x¯ − m(b))
b2
< 0, as x¯ m(b), and m′(b) 0, ∀b.
Further,
θ˜
(
b∗(x¯, θA)
)= θA + x¯ − x¯
b∗(x¯, θA)
= θA, and
θ˜
(
b∗(x¯, θD)
)= θA + x¯ − m(b∗(x¯, θD))
b∗(x¯, θD)
= θA + b
∗(x¯, θD)(θD − θA)
b∗(x¯, θD)
= θD.
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To conclude the proof we have to show that the solutions of the two cases we derived above
“glue” with each other, i.e., b∗(x, θ) is a continuous function in the entire range. To show
this, consider the (x¯, θD)-type. The solution according to (1) is
b∗(x¯, θD) = 2x¯2θD − w1θA − (1 − w1)θD
and according to (2) is
b∗(x¯, θD) = 2x¯2θD − z1(b)θA − (1 − z1(b))θD .
Notice that, as in this case θ˜ (b) = θD , z1(b) becomes equal to (1/G(θD))
∫ 1
0 G(θA + (θD −
θA)t)dt , which reduces to w1. This argument completes the proof. 
Proposition 6 provides the characterization of a symmetric equilibrium in the continu-
um-of-types case. We have shown that equilibrium bid functions are piecewise linear
functions that can be decomposed into “low” and “high” bids. It would be more informa-
tive to rewrite equilibrium “low” bids after undertaking the following change of variables,
y = θA + (θD − θA)t . Given that w1 ≡
∫ 1
0 G(θA + (θD − θA)t)dt , (1) can be rewritten as
b∗(x, θ) = 2x
2θ + ∫ θD
θA
G(y)dy − θD
= 2x
2θ − EG(θ) , (3)
where the equality follows from integration by parts. Similarly, it is again more conve-
nient to rewrite equilibrium “high” bids, by performing a similar as above transformation.
Given that z1(b) = (1/G(θ˜(b)))
∫ 1
0 G(θA + (θ˜(b)− θA)t)dt , by undertaking the change of
variables y = θA + (θ˜ (b) − θA)t , Eq. (2) becomes
b∗(x, θ) = 2x
2θ + 1
G(θ˜(b))
∫ θ˜ (b)
θA
G(y)dy − θ˜ (b)
= 2x
2θ − EG[θ | θ  θ˜G(b)]
, (4)
where again the equality follows from integration by parts. It is now straightforward to see
that the equilibrium bid functions are given by
b∗(x, θ) =

2x
2θ−EG(θ) if x ∈ [0,
x¯(2θ−EG(θ))
2θD−EG(θ) ],
2x
2θ−EG[θ |θθ˜G(b)] if x ∈ [
x¯(2θ−EG(θ))
2θD−EG(θ) , x¯] .
To better understand the properties of the equilibrium bid functions, we present an ex-
ample in which both θ and x are uniformly distributed, and moreover we set x¯ = 1, θA = 1,
and θD  2. It is now straightforward to calculate the equilibrium bid functions:
b∗(x, θ) =

4x
4θ−θD−1 if x ∈ [0, 4θ−θD−13θD−1 ],
3x+1
3θ−1 if x ∈ [ 4θ−θD−13θD−1 ,1].
Note that the bid functions are piecewise linear in x. They have a steeper slope in the first
segment, and moreover this slope is decreasing in θ . The fact that the slope is decreasing
in θ shows that the more efficient a bidder is (i.e., the smaller her θ is), the more aggres-
sively she bids.
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An alternative approach to further understand and interpret the equilibrium bids is to
compute the density mass of the equilibrium iso-bids. This allows us to see how likely
it is that a particular bid is submitted. Denote as βG(b) the density mass of the iso-bid
corresponding to bG.25
Consider first low equilibrium bids, i.e., bG(x, θ) = 2x/(2θ −EG(θ)). By reparameter-
izing and using that (x(θ), θ) = (b(2θ − EG(θ))/2, θ), we get that
βG(b) =
θD∫
θA
g(θ)
x¯
√
1 + b2 dθ =
√
1 + b2
x¯
.
Notice that for low bids, βG(b) does not depend upon G. This is the case because low bids
may be submitted from bidders whose θ can take any value in [θA, θD], and moreover,
because the mass of signals that can produce the bid, measured by M(b) − m(b), is inde-
pendent of G. Consequently, the mass of types along an iso-bid that represents a low bid
is not affected by G. As a result throughout the whole range of low equilibrium bids the
winner’s curse remains unchanged.26
For high bids, in contrast, the distribution of θ affects the density of types on a given
equilibrium bid, which is now given by
βG(b) =
θ˜G(b)∫
θA
g(θ)
x¯
√
1 + b2 dθ =
√
1 + b2
x¯
G
(
θ˜G(b)
)
.
Notice that now it is not the case that all types of bidders may submit these bids. Bidders
with θ > θ˜G are not present. Hence, the specific form of G affects the mass of types that
may be submitting a particular bid. Moreover, the larger is the bid we consider, the smaller
is the set of bidders that can possibly submit such bid, and the larger is the mass of rather
advantaged bidders in this distribution. As a result the winner’s curse gets attenuated.
4.2. Convergence to symmetric auction
It is of particular interest to understand the behavior of the equilibrium as one considers
the limit case in which the asymmetries among bidders disappear and the auction converges
to a symmetric one. This is accomplished by performing comparative statics, as we let
the distribution of θ , G, converge to a Dirac delta distribution. By fixing the “spike” or
the mass point at θ = θC , we can study the limiting behavior of the equilibrium bids as
{Gn(θ)} → δθC , where θA  θC  θB . In the limit, the equilibrium strategies converge to
the symmetric equilibrium strategies of the symmetric auction, i.e., limθ→θC b∗(x, θ) =
b∗(x, θC) = 2x/θC , ∀x.
25 We now explicitly denote that bids are functions of G, the distribution of θ .
26 To avoid any misinterpretation, we would like to stress that this result does not imply that the equilibrium bids
are independent of the distribution of θ . As it will be shown in Section 4.3, the distribution of low equilibrium
bids is affected by G.
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Proposition 7. For all θC ∈ [θA, θD], as {Gn(θ)} → δθC in distribution, the symmetric
equilibrium strategies of the asymmetric auction converge pointwise to the symmetric equi-
librium strategies of the symmetric auction.
Proof. The analysis is split in two cases: (a) Low bids, i.e., bids below B̂ , in which equi-
librium bids are determined by Eq. (3), and (b) high bids, i.e., bids in (B̂,B], in which
equilibrium bids are determined by Eq. (4). Consider the first case: According to (3),
b∗(x, θ) = 2x/(2θ − ∫ θD
θA
yg(y)dy). Using the fact that the delta function obeys the shift-
ing property:
∫ b
a
f (y)δ(y − θC)dy = f (θC) (see Bracewell, 1999, pp. 74–75), we have
that
∫ θD
θA
yg(y)dy → θC , which implies b∗(x, θC) → 2x/θC . Consider now the second
case. According to (4),
b∗(x, θ) = 2x
2θ − (∫ θ˜ (b)
θA
yg(y)dy/G(θ˜(b)))
.
Using again the shifting property of the Dirac function we have that
∫ θ˜ (b)
θA
yg(y)dy → θC
and G(θ˜(b)) → 1, which implies b∗(x, θC) → 2x/θC . Nonetheless, note that now these
results rely on the fact that θ˜ (b) converges to θC . To prove this claim, we derive the limiting
behavior of z1(b). By its definition, as {Gn(θ)} → δθC ,
z1(b) ≡
∫ 1
0 G(θA + (θ˜ (b) − θA)t)dt
G(θ˜(b))
→ θ˜ (b) − θC
θ˜(b) − θA
.
On the other hand, by solving Eq. (2) for z1(b), when θ = θ˜ and x = x¯, we get that z1(b) =
(2x¯/b− θ˜ (b))/(θ˜(b)−θA). Since from the first part of the proof we know that 2x¯/b → θC ,
the right-hand side of the above equation converges to (θC − θ˜ (b))/(θ˜(b) − θA). Hence,
a necessary condition for the above equation to hold in the limit is that θ˜ (b) → θC . This
argument completes the proof. 
Comparing Propositions 4 and 7, one can check that the results delivered in the two-
type case were not due to the fact that we do not restrict attention to continuous strategies.
This can be easily understood by Proposition 7: Although the equilibrium strategies are
continuous and strictly increasing, the properties of the equilibrium have nothing to do with
the results found in the literature. To the contrary, the equilibrium is qualitatively similar to
the one reached in the two-type case. In both cases, as we consider a sequence of auctions
converging to the symmetric one the equilibrium converges to the symmetric equilibrium of
the symmetric auction. Remember that according to Proposition 3 in Bikhchandani (1988),
the symmetric equilibrium does not belong to the set of equilibria, as one considers a
sequence of auctions converging to the symmetric auction.
4.3. Severity of financial constraints
Another comparative statics’ exercise that is interesting to perform is to check how
bidders’ behavior is affected when considering changes in the distribution of θs (G), and
which are the repercussions on seller’s expected revenues. To understand why this exercise
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is of interest one has to remember that θ can be understood as the marginal cost of raising
money to finance a bid. In that sense, distributions that place more mass on higher values
of θ represent more financially constrained bidders. Hence, when considering two possible
distributions of θ , G and H , the assumption that G first-order stochastically dominates H
is equivalent to saying that bidders under G are more financially constrained than under H .
4.3.1. Equilibrium bid functions
We first analyze how the equilibrium bid functions are affected by the severity of finan-
cial constraints. The result is that, conditional on her type, a bidder bids more aggressively
when all bidders are more financially constrained. The intuition is rather clear, when her
opponents are more financially constrained, her winner’s curse gets attenuated and she bids
more aggressively. This comes at odds with the result derived by Che and Gale (1998),
where a bidder of specific type bids the same. The difference between this paper and Che
and Gale (1998) is twofold: First, they consider budget constraints, and second, they con-
sider a private values framework.27 Fang and Parreiras (2002) showed that it was the private
values assumption that allowed Che and Gale to reach this conclusion. By considering
a framework with budget constraints and affiliated values, they derived the same result as
we do.
Nonetheless, it has to be stressed that the use of budget constraints, instead of the more
general financial constraints we employ, also affects the result. When considering budget
constraints, more financially constrained bidders are those with smaller budgets. Nonethe-
less, for low bids, i.e., bids such that none of the bidders’ budget constraints are binding,
all bidders are symmetric, in the sense that they all have the same cost of financing a bid.
Here in contrast, bidders’ behavior is always affected (no matter how small the bid a bid-
der contemplates in placing) by the severity of her financial constraint. This is the reason
why we get our result, even when we restrict attention to the low bids, while Fang and
Parreiras (2002) get for low bids the result derived in Che and Gale (1998). The following
proposition delivers formally the result.28
Proposition 8. Let G and H belong to the family of log-concave distributions. If G strictly
second-order stochastically dominates (SSD) H , then b∗H (x, θ) < b∗G(x, θ), for all (x, θ)
such that x ∈ (0, x¯) and all θ .
Proof. For any given distribution of θ we have shown that the support of equilibrium
bids is given by [0, B¯]. Further, this set comprises low and high bids, in such a way that
[0, B¯] = [0, B̂F ] ∪ [B̂F , B¯], where B̂F = b∗F (x¯, θD).29
27 Budget constraints can be understood as special cases of our framework, in which the marginal cost of financ-
ing a bid is one until the bidder reaches her budget constraint and then becomes infinite.
28 Although in the analysis we present the comparative statics in terms of first-order stochastic dominance, as this
is the most transparent way to provide an intuition for the result, the proposition does not require such a strong
condition and it is proved for second-order stochastic dominance. Note that first-order stochastic dominance
implies second-order stochastic dominance.
29 Hereafter, we denote the bid that separates low and high bids as B̂F , where F stands for a generic distribution
of θ , in order to underline the fact that it depends on the employed distribution. The same convention is employed
for other variables when necessary.
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Consider first low bids. The distribution of θ affects bidding behavior via its impact on
wF1 . Remember that w
F
1 ≡
∫ 1
0 F(θA + (θD − θA)t)dt . By the definition of strict SSD, G
SSD H if and only if
∫ θ
θA
H(t)dt >
∫ θ
θA
G(t)dt , for all θ > θA. After a straightforward
change of variables, we get that this implies that
wH1 =
1
(θD − θA)
θD∫
θA
H(y)dy >
1
(θD − θA)
θD∫
θA
G(y)dy = wG1 .
Since b∗F is a decreasing function in wF1 , two results follow: First, B̂H < B̂G, and second,
b∗H (x, θ) < b∗G(x, θ), for all b∗ ∈ [0, B̂H ].
Consider now bids in [B̂G, B¯], i.e. bids in the set of high bids for both distributions. By
Eq. (4), we have
b∗F (x, θ) =
2x
2θ − EF [θ | θ  θ˜F (b)]
.
Thus, in this case, the distribution of θ affects bidding behavior through its impact on
EF [θ | θ  θ˜F (b)]. Specifically, b∗G(x, θ) > b∗H (x, θ) if and only if EG[θ | θ  θ˜G(b)] >
EH [θ | θ  θ˜H (b)]. Now, for a given, arbitrary θ˜ (b), Ogryczak and Ruszczynski (2002)
show30 that if G SSD H , then EG[θ | θ  θ˜ (b)]  EH [θ | θ  θ˜ (b)]. Moreover, since
EF [θ | θ  θ˜ (b)] is strictly increasing in θ˜ (b), if θ˜G(b) > θ˜H (b), then EG[θ | θ 
θ˜G(b)] > EG[θ | θ  θ˜H (b)]  EH [θ | θ  θ˜H (b)]. This will allow us to conclude that
b∗G(x, θ) > b∗H (x, θ). In what follows we show that this is indeed the case, as indeed
θ˜G(b) > θ˜H (b). To show this, consider the implicit equation that determines θ˜F (b):
2x¯/b − θ˜F (b)
θ˜F (b) − θA
=
∫ 1
0 F(θA + (θ˜F (b) − θA)t)dt
F (θ˜F (b))
,
or equivalently,
2x¯
b
− θ˜F (b) = θ˜F (b) − EF
[
θ | θ  θ˜F (b)].
Thus, for a given b, and for any G and H , if G SSD H , then
2x¯
b
= 2θ˜G(b) − EG
[
θ | θ  θ˜G(b)] 2θ˜G(b) − EH [θ | θ  θ˜G(b)],
2x¯
b
= 2θ˜H (b) − EH
[
θ | θ  θ˜H (b)].
Since 2θ˜H (b) − EH [θ | θ  θ˜H (b)]  2θ˜G(b) − EH [θ | θ  θ˜G(b)], it follows from the
log-concavity of both G and H that θ˜H (b) θ˜G(b).31
30 See Theorem 3.2 in Ogryczak and Ruszczynski (2002).
31 The function δ(x) = x − EF [y | y  x] is monotonically increasing in x if and only if J (x) =
∫ x
l F (y)dy is
log-concave. Now, the log-concavity of J is implied by the log-concavity of f (y) or of F(y) (see Theorem 3 in
Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 1989).
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Finally, for bids in [B̂H , B̂G] the result follows trivially from the continuity and strict
monotonicity of the equilibrium bids, which given the above results, do not allow a situa-
tion in which b∗H > b∗G to arise. 
4.3.2. Expected revenues
Until now we have shown that a bidder of a given type (x, θ) bids more aggressively
when bidders are more likely to be disadvantaged, i.e., she bids more under G than un-
der H . This is a rather counterintuitive result given that it means that bidders in more
financially constrained environments bid more aggressively. It should be stressed though
that this result does not carry over in a straightforward way when we consider the effects
financial constraints have on seller’s expected revenues. I.e., one cannot extend the pre-
vious argument and say that expected revenues are larger under G than under H , as the
distribution of types depends on which is the distribution of θ . In fact, in our setup, under
H any given type bids less but types that bid high (i.e., those with low θ ) become more
frequent. Notice that the probability of having advantaged bidders equals to H(θ), which is
larger than G(θ). As these two effects go in opposite directions, we cannot unconditionally
conclude that seller’s expected revenues are lower under H , which would have been tanta-
mount to saying that the seller benefits when her bidders are more financially constrained.
To compute the expected revenues we need the distribution of the equilibrium bids. Note
that the probability that a bid smaller or equal than b is realized can be easily calculated by
integrating over all iso-bid curves up to the one representing b. For low bids, up to B̂F , we
have:
DF (b) =
θD∫
θA
b
2x¯
(
2θ − EF (θ)
)
f (θ)dθ = bEF (θ)
2x¯
.
Now, by using the fact that if G SSD H then EG(θ)  EH(θ), we obtain that DG(b) 
DH(b).
For high bids in [B̂F , B¯] we get that
DF (b) = 1 − F (θ˜F (b))+ θ˜
F (b)∫
θA
b
2x¯
(
2θ − EF
[
θ | θ  θ˜F (b)])f (θ)dθ,
= 1 − F (θ˜F (b))+ b
2x¯
θ˜F (b)∫
θA
θf (θ)dθ = 1 − b
x¯
θ˜F (b)∫
θA
F (θ)dθ,
where last equality follows from the definition of high bids, which implies that (b/2x¯)
(θ˜F (b)F (θ˜F (b)) + ∫ θ˜F (b)
θA
F (θ)dθ) = F(θ˜F (b)).
Now, DG(b)  DH(b) iff
∫ θ˜H (b)
θA
H(θ)dθ 
∫ θ˜G(b)
θA
G(θ)dθ. If G FSD H , then∫ θ˜ (b)
θA
H(θ)dθ 
∫ θ˜ (b)
θA
G(θ)dθ . Thus, were θ˜G(b) = θ˜H (b), then DG(b)  DH(b) for
high bids too. Nonetheless, it has been previously shown that under SSD θ˜G(b) > θ˜H (b),
so that the ranking between DG(b) and DH(b) is ambiguous. One could in principle ex-
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pect that the dominance effect dominates the θ˜ effect, and hence to get DG(b)DH(b).
Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that this is always the case.
Expected revenues can be derived by employing the distribution function of the second-
order statistic, DF(2)(b), with RF = ∫ B¯0 b dDF(2)(b). Note that if the distribution of equi-
librium bids under H dominates the one under G, i.e., DH(b)DG(b), then DH(2)(b)
DG(2)(b) does also hold, and hence expected revenues will be larger under H than un-
der G, i.e., RH  RG, even though the distribution H is stochastically dominated by G.
Thus, if DH(b)DG(b), then seller’s expected revenues are larger when bidders are less
likely to face severe financial constraints, even though the opposite holds when considering
equilibrium bids.
In what follows we show that this is the case for a large family of distributions. We
now focus on the following family of log-concave distributions, F(θ;a) = (θ − 1)a with
support [1,2]. Note that F(θ;a1) strictly FSD F(θ;a2) iff a1 > a2. Let G(θ) = F(θ;a1)
and H(θ) = F(θ;a2) with a1 > a2, so that G FSD H . Within this family, we can explicitly
derive θ˜H (b). In particular, for any bid in [B̂F , B¯],
θ˜H (b) = a1 − a2 + θ˜
G(b)(a2 + 1)(a1 + 2)
(a2 + 2)(a1 + 1) , (5)
which is easily obtained from
θ˜H (b) +
∫ θ˜H (b)
1 H(z)dz
H(θ˜H (b))
= θ˜G(b) +
∫ θ˜G(b)
1 G(z)dz
G(θ˜G(b))
.
For high bids, we showed that DG(b)  DH(b) iff
∫ θ˜H (b)
θA
H(θ)dθ 
∫ θ˜G(b)
θA
G(θ)dθ .
After substituting for the specific G and H and integrating, the inequality above simplifies
to
(a1 + 1)
(
θ˜H (b) − 1)a2+1  (a2 + 1)(θ˜G(b) − 1)a1+1,
or, after substituting θH (b) with its value as derived in Eq. (5),
(a1 + 1)
(
(a2 + 1)(a1 + 2)
(a2 + 2)(a1 + 1)
)a2+1(
θG(b) − 1)a2+1  (a2 + 1)(θG(b) − 1)a1+1.
As G FSD H , we know that (θ˜G(b)−1)a2+1  (θ˜G(b)−1)a1+1. Consequently, a sufficient
condition to ensure that DG(b)DH(b) holds is given by
(a1 + 1)
(
(a2 + 1)(a1 + 2)
(a2 + 2)(a1 + 1)
)a2+1
 (a2 + 1). (6)
Straightforward operations allow us to rewrite the inequality above as(
a1 + 2
a2 + 2
)a2+1

(
a2 + 1
a1 + 1
)a2
.
Since (a1 + 2)/(a2 + 2)  1  (a2 + 1)/(a1 + 1) whenever a1 > a2, Eq. (6) holds as
claimed.32
32 In Appendix B, we also provide an example with a uniform and a quadratic distribution, in which expected
revenues are explicitly computed and compared. There too we derive the same result.
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5. Conclusions
The literature has demonstrated that second-price, common-value auctions are sensitive
to the presence of asymmetries among bidders. For example, Bikhchandani (1988) has
shown that if it is common knowledge that a bidder has a disadvantage compared to her
opponent, that bidder (almost surely) never wins the auction. We show that this result does
not carry over when one allows for two-sided uncertainty. Even if the probabilities that one
of the bidders is an advantaged type while the other is a disadvantaged type are arbitrarily
large, in every equilibrium, the disadvantaged type bidder needs to win the auction with
strictly positive probability.
We then solve for the equilibria in two cases, one with two types and another with a
continuum of types. We show that in the two-type case there is no symmetric equilibrium
in continuous strategies and we construct an equilibrium in asymmetric and discontinuous
strategies, while in the continuum-of-types case we construct a symmetric equilibrium
in continuous strategies. We derive the convergence properties of both equilibria, and
we show that they converge to the symmetric equilibria of the corresponding symmet-
ric auctions. This is also true when considering convergence in terms of expected revenue
performance. In other words, we reestablish a lost linkage in the analysis of pure-common-
value and almost-common-value auctions. We thus highlight the fact that the presumed
sensitivity to the presence of asymmetries was delivered due to specific characteristics in
the extensions considered in the literature.
Finally, we are able to address the related but distinct literature of auctions under finan-
cially constrained bidders. We show in the continuum-of-types model that when bidders
operate in a more financially constrained environment they bid more aggressively because
their winner’s curse gets attenuated. I.e., we are able to generalize the result derived in Fang
and Parreiras (2002), in a model where the financial constraints were taking the specific
form of budget constraints.
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Appendix A
Throughout the paper, the analysis was based on the assumption that the efficiency
handicap among different types of bidders, i.e., the range of θ , is not large enough to
outweigh the importance of the signals the bidders receive about the value of the object
(i.e., the x’s). For example, the proposition in the continuum-of-types case relies on the
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fact that (0, θA)-bidder always bids zero, as her efficiency advantage does not outweigh
her informational disadvantage. If θD > 2 though, then (0, θA)-bidder must win over any
(x, θD)-type. In this case, the equilibrium needs to be modified.33
Consider the following example: let x be uniformly distributed on [0,1], and θ be uni-
formly distributed on [1,4]. We claim that the following strategies constitute a symmetric
equilibrium:
b∗(x, θ) =

3x
3θ−4 if x ∈ [0, 3θ−48 ], 4/3 < θ  4,
2x+1
2θ if x ∈ [ 3θ−48 , θ−12 ], 1 < θ < 4,
3x+1
3θ−1 if x ∈ [ θ−12 ,1],1 < θ < 3.
Further, type (0,4/3) randomizes over the bids in the interval [0,3/8].
Proof. Assume that bidder I follows this strategy, and consider the best reply of bidder II.
No matter what her θ is, she maximizes her expected profit by bidding up to the point in
which she is indifferent about whether she is selected as a winner, when she is involved in a
tie. Now, the true value of the object, when bidding b and facing a tie, is (xII + xEI (b))/θII ,
where xEI (b) stands for the expected value of her opponent’s signal in the event of a tie
when bidding b. Since her opponent iso-bids are linear and distributions are uniform, then
xEI (b) =

M(b)
2 if b ∈ [0, 38 ], M(b) such that b∗(M(b),4) = b,
1
2 if b ∈ [ 38 , 12 ],
m(b)+1
2 if b ∈ [ 12 ,2], m(b) such that b∗(m(b),1) = b.
As b∗(x, θ) is equal to this expression, (b∗, b∗) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium in
continuous strategies. 
Figure A.1 provides a graphical illustration of the equilibrium bids for θ¯ = 1, θ¯ = 5/4,
θ¯ = 3/2, θ¯ = 2, θ¯ = 5/2, θ¯ = 3, and θ¯ = 4.
Appendix B
This appendix derives explicitly seller’s expected revenues and compares them in an
example with a quadratic and a uniform distribution for the θs. Let G(θ) = (θ2 − 1)/3,
and H(θ) = θ − 1, where θ ∈ [1,2]. Note that G FSD H , as intended.
It is easy to see that the c.d.f. of equilibrium bids under H is given by
DH(b) =
{
3b
4 if 0 b
4
5 ,
1
9b
−1(8 − b)(2b − 1) if 45  b 2.
Expected revenues can be readily computed: RH = ∫ 20 2b(1 − DH(b))dDH(b) = 0.4424.
33 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for turning our attention to this case.
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Fig. A.1. Bidding strategies.
Similarly, we get the c.d.f. of the equilibrium bids under G,
DG(b) =
{
7b
9 if 0 b
9
11 ,
b
2 (
1
36b3 A
3 − 29 ) − 112b2 A2 + 43 if 911  b 2,
where A = (√3√4b + 4b2 + 3 − 2b + 3)/2. In this case, expected revenues are RG =∫ 2
0 2b(1 − DG(b))dDG(b) = 0.42665. Therefore, expected revenues are larger under the
uniform than under the quadratic distribution, i.e., expected revenues are larger when bid-
ders are less financially constrained.
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